Sovereign Default Risk and the U.S. Equity Market

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Abstract

The present paper develops a two-country, two-good consumption-based asset-pricing model with firms, governments, and endogenous default decisions. The analysis shows that a negative economic shock in the U.S. increases equity return volatility beyond the standard firm leverage effects; this economic shock is transmitted internationally through the terms of trade and increases the risk of a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets. A rise in the risk of sovereign default, which is characterized by a contraction in economic growth, lowers the valuation of future firm earnings and thereby further increases the level of equity return volatility in the U.S. A structural estimation of the model provides support for this new channel; the expected loss in economic growth upon sovereign default helps explain the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. The results of this paper have important implications for recent empirical findings on the strong relationship between equity market volatility in the U.S. and sovereign credit risk in emerging economies, in particular during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.

JEL Codes: F31, F34, G12, G13, G15
Keywords: Sovereign Debt, Corporate Debt, Credit Risk, Asset Pricing, International Financial Markets, Foreign Exchange

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1 Introduction

A decade of international financial crises has illustrated the importance of understanding the interactions between the U.S. equity market and the risk of sovereign default in emerging economies. For example, sovereign credit spreads severely widened during the recent financial crisis, which was also characterized by a sharp increase in U.S. equity market volatility.\footnote{Empirical studies documenting the relationship between sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets and equity market volatility in the U.S. measured by the option-implied volatility index on the S&P500 (VIX) include, for example, McGuire and Schrijvers (2003), González-Rozada and Yeyati (2008), Pan and Singleton (2008), Remolona et al. (2008), Hilscher and Nosbusch (2009), and Longstaff et al. (2009).} To date, we do not have a framework that facilitates our understanding of the relationship between equity market volatility in the U.S. and sovereign credit risk in emerging economies. The aim of the present paper is to provide such a framework.

The analysis shows that a negative economic shock in the U.S. not only produces direct adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility but also negatively affects the emerging markets that trade with the U.S. This economic shock increases their risk of sovereign default, which thereby amplifies the initial increase in equity market volatility in the U.S. A structural estimation of the model provides strong support for this prediction; the adverse economic consequences of a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets help explain the level and volatility of equity returns. The contribution of this paper is in showing that the evaluation of financial securities in the U.S. should not ignore economic conditions in emerging markets. In particular, the importance of accounting for sovereign credit risk is clear, given that sovereign debt is currently the largest asset class in emerging markets and a major constituent in international crises.

This article endogenizes the default decisions of firms and governments within a general equilibrium model with international trade. The building block is a two-country, two-good consumption-based asset-pricing model with a representative risk-averse agent for each country. The world consists of a developed and an emerging country that are subject to production shocks. Embedded in each country is a representative firm that produces a specific good and is financed by equity and debt. When considering a negative production shock in the developed economy, two sets of consequences arise. On one hand, this shock deteriorates the developed firm’s earnings and increases its equity return volatility. The negative relationship between a firm’s earnings and equity return volatility arises because of the presence of corporate debt, which creates a financial leverage effect, and of firm operating costs, which generate an operational leverage effect. Equity return volatility is thus countercyclical. On the other hand, this negative shock is also transmitted internationally through the terms of trade, which are defined as the
price of the developed country’s good per unit price of the emerging country’s good; the shock thus affects the emerging firm’s earnings. The intuition is as follows: the negative economic shock in the developed country is accompanied by an improvement of the terms of trade because the developed good becomes relatively rare. As the terms of trade move against the emerging country, the relative price of that country’s good falls, thus leading to a decrease in the emerging firm’s earnings. The emerging country’s government collects less tax revenue when firm earnings are reduced. Therefore, a deterioration of the fiscal situation of this government increases the probability that it will be unable to service its debt. Sovereign credit risk is then high during adverse economic conditions. Defaulting on sovereign debt causes a loss in economic growth in addition to the initial production decline that triggered the default event. The risk of a contraction in economic growth reduces the expected value of future firm exports in the developed country through a depreciation of the terms of trade, which further decreases the value of the firm’s assets and thus amplifies the initial increase in the level of equity return volatility. Thus, this paper suggests a new amplification mechanism of volatility that is, in essence, a “macro leverage effect.”

A structural estimation of the model provides strong support for this new prediction. That is, the presence of sovereign default risk in emerging markets affects the level and volatility of equity returns in the U.S. The structural test of the model consists of estimating the expected loss in economic growth upon default using the generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Hansen (1982). The moments under consideration are the first two moments of equity returns in Brazil and in the U.S. over the past 15 years. I use information on monthly industrial production data for Brazil and the U.S. to generate the asset prices predicted by the model, thus producing the moment conditions, which are matched to those of the data as closely as possible. I use Brazil as a representative emerging country for two reasons: first, it is a large trading partner of the U.S. and has sizable sovereign credit risk; second, the data on sovereign credit spreads, stock market prices, and industrial production for Brazil cover a longer period than for any other emerging country. A goodness-of-fit test suggests that the model cannot be rejected at 90% confidence level. In addition, the estimate of the expected loss in economic growth upon default is statistically significant at 99% confidence level and thus contributes to the explanation of the level and volatility of equity returns in Brazil and in the U.S.

An additional empirical analysis provides evidence for the countercyclical nature of both equity return

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2 Co-movement in firm earnings arises in response to a production shock in one of the countries despite the independence of output innovations among countries.

3 The model is calibrated to match the dynamics of industrial production in both countries, the corporate leverage ratios, and the government debt-to-GDP ratio in Brazil.
volatility in the U.S. and sovereign credit risk, as predicted by the model using daily data for Brazil and for the U.S. over the period of 1994-2008.\textsuperscript{4} The relationship between equity return volatility, which is estimated with a GARCH(1,1) model on S&P500 returns, and sovereign credit spread, which is measured with the JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index spread for Brazil, is positive and particularly high during the recent period of financial distress (2007-2008).\textsuperscript{5} This positive relationship has induced the empirical literature to conclude that equity return volatility in the U.S. explains sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets. The model in this paper offers a complementary explanation: a rise in the risk of a sovereign default increases the level of equity return volatility in the U.S. through the macro leverage effect.

This paper builds on a number of models belonging to separate strands of literature. The two-country, two-good consumption-based asset-pricing model used in this paper is essentially that of Pavlova and Rigobon (2007, 2008), which is based on the works of Helpman and Razin (1978), Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Dumas (1992), and Zapatero (1995).\textsuperscript{6} The key contribution of the present paper is to introduce levered firms, governments, and endogenous default decisions into this framework. The modeling of the government in the emerging country, which issues some debt and decides the timing of the default, follows Gibson and Sundaresan (2001), François (2006), Yue (2006), Arellano (2008), and Jeanneret (2009), among others. However, sovereign default is opportunistic in these studies. In the present paper, sovereign default occurs when the fiscal revenues become insufficient to cover the debt service. Hence, a sovereign default is triggered by the inability rather than the unwillingness to pay. Defaulting causes local contraction in economic growth. This output cost of sovereign debt default is also present in the works of Cohen and Sachs (1986), Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Yue (2006), Arellano (2008), Andrade (2009), Guimaraes (2009), and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), among others.\textsuperscript{7} This assumption is


\textsuperscript{5}To date, the empirical literature has focused on how sovereign credit spreads relate to the VIX, which is a forward-looking measure, rather than to equity return volatility, which is a realized volatility measure. However, I provide evidence that the positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and the VIX arises from the positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and equity return volatility. Equity return volatility explains 80\% of the variation of the VIX. The remaining part is attributed to a volatility risk premium, which has an unclear relationship with sovereign credit spreads.

\textsuperscript{6}The presence of a contagion effect of economic shocks through the foreign exchange market is in line with Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) and Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon (2005). Both studies conclude that movements in exchange rates explain a large fraction of the contagion across international equity markets.

\textsuperscript{7}It is not clear, thus far, what the exact costs of sovereign default are; there is weak empirical support for the default costs due to reputation effect on future borrowing opportunities (Eichengreen, 1987; Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2004), trade sanctions (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2008), and armed interventions since World War II (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). However, sovereign default seems to weaken the domestic financial system and thereby increase the probability of banking crisis (De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta, 2006; Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006; Borensztein and Panizza, 2008). As major creditors of the government, domestic banks may thus be prevented from competing their
consistent with the empirical evidence of Reinhart et al. (2003), De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), and Borensztein and Panizza (2008).\(^8\)

The evaluation of firm assets builds upon the corporate finance literature (e.g., Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1994, 1998), and Morellec (2004)). That is, shareholders select the default policy that maximizes the value of equity by trading off the tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs in default. This paper also relates to Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009a,b), and Chen (2009), who analyzed how macroeconomic conditions affect corporate capital structure decisions and the evaluation of assets; in this paper, the sovereign default triggers the change of macroeconomic regime, which reduces the valuation of future firm earnings through a contraction in output growth. A new outcome of the present paper is that the probability of sovereign default affects a firm’s probability of defaulting, which thereby reduces the value of its assets. The value of a firm’s assets then depends on this firm’s decision to default before or after the sovereign defaults, which is determined \textit{ex ante} by shareholders to maximize the value of equity. The government’s default decision in the emerging country and the evaluation of the developed country’s asset prices are then closely related.

Finally, the paper accounts for the role of the terms of trade in the evaluation of asset prices through the effect on sovereign and corporate credit risk. The reason is that the balance sheets are skewed towards debt denominated in a world basket and revenues denominated in the local good. That is, depreciation of the terms of trade has a negative balance sheet effect because it decreases the worth of both government fiscal revenues and corporate earnings relative to their level of debt, thereby reducing their capacity to honor their debt.\(^9\) To my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyze the interactions between the foreign exchange market, international corporate asset prices, and sovereign default risk.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a two-country consumption-based asset-pricing model with endogenous default decisions. A description of the data and the calibration of the parameters are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 consists of structural estimation of the model. Section 5 offers an empirical analysis of the relationship between equity market volatility and sovereign credit risk. I conclude my analysis in Section 6.

\(^8\)The direction of causality in the relationship between sovereign default and GDP growth documented in these studies raises some questions: debt default is a direct consequence of economic shocks that also hurt growth in a direct fashion. In addition, the anticipation of the default costs can affect output growth before the event.

\(^9\)Empirical evidence on the relationship between exchange rate depreciation and default include, for example, Reinhart (2002) and De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006). In addition, Longstaff et al. (2009) provide recent empirical evidence that, after controlling for large set of global and local macroeconomic factors, sovereign credit risk increases as the sovereign’s currency depreciates relative to the U.S. dollar.
2 The Model

The world I model consists of two types of countries, namely, emerging and developed. A developed country is a large country with a default-free government and a firm. An emerging country is a small market economy with a defaultable government and a firm. Financial markets are complete before and after default. The tax environment consists of a constant tax rate for corporate income and a zero tax rate for individual income. All parameters in the model are assumed to be common knowledge.

2.1 Structure of the Economy

Each country consists of a representative firm that raises revenues by producing a country-specific perishable good. There is a large number of infinitely-living households with logarithmic preferences in both economies. They are the owners and the lenders of the firms and the lenders of the governments. These households receive the produced goods, which are then traded across countries and consumed. In equilibrium, households do not save. The terms of trade are defined in terms of the price of the developed country’s good per unit of the price of the emerging country’s good. Both countries are subject to production shocks, which are propagated internationally through the terms of trade. A shock in a country is then perfectly shared with the other country.

Each government raises fiscal revenues by taxing the value of its domestic firm’s earnings. While the debt issued by the developed government is risk-free, the emerging government can default on its debt obligation. It does so when the fiscal revenues cannot meet the required coupon payment. Therefore, the emerging country’s creditworthiness essentially depends on the level of the emerging firm’s earnings. The government of the emerging country also plays an important role in the path of the emerging country through its decision to issue and default on its debt. On one hand, the issuance of greater sovereign debt allows for the fostering of production growth in the emerging country, which is beneficial for the emerging firm’s earnings. On the other hand, the increase in indebtedness raises the risk of a sovereign default.

In the event of default, the emerging country enters a recession, which is characterized by a fall in production growth. Thus, sovereign default occurs after negative economic shocks and induces significant costs for subsequent economic activity. Avoidance of this default cost in terms of economic performance, in particular for future fiscal revenues, is the sovereign country’s motivation not to default. The fall in the emerging country’s growth rate also has adverse consequences for the developed country’s firm revenues through a depreciation of the terms of trade. Sovereign credit risk thus affects the evaluation of a firm’s assets in both countries. The absence of regime in the developed country arises from the assumption that
the government debt in that country is risk-free.

Because firms pay taxes on their earnings, they have an incentive to issue debt. Firms are then financed by equity and debt. A firm is liquidated when it defaults on its debt obligations. Shareholders decide whether the firm defaults before or after the government defaults. Default is triggered by the shareholder decision to optimally cease injecting funds into the firm. At that time, a new representative firm with identical value and level of debt emerges. The bankruptcy costs upon default consist of liquidation fees paid to a third party (e.g., lawyers) that are subject to taxes. The government raises taxes from the new firm’s earnings and from the third party’s gain after the firm’s default. Therefore, there is continuity in production, consumption, and fiscal revenues.

**Figure 1:** Structure of the Model.
2.2 Dynamics of Production and Macroeconomic Regimes

Let $Y_t$ denote the perpetual stream of output produced by the firm located in the developed country at time $t$, which evolves according to the process

$$
\frac{dY_t}{Y_t} = \theta_y dt + \sigma_y W^y_t \tag{1}
$$

where $W^y_t$ is a Brownian motion defined on the probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$. The standard filtration of $W^y_t$ is $F = \{\mathcal{F}_t : t \geq 0\}$. The conditional moments $\theta_y$ and $\sigma_y$ represent the expected growth rate and the volatility of the representative firm’s output in the developed country.

The emerging country is characterized by two different states of growth, namely, a normal regime $H$ until the government in the emerging country defaults on its debt and a low, or recession, regime $L$ after the default event. The dynamics of the perpetual stream of output generated by the emerging country’s representative firm is governed by the process

$$
\frac{dX_t}{X_t} = \theta_{x,i} dt + \sigma_x dW^x_i, \quad i = \{L, H\} \tag{2}
$$

where $W^x_i$ is a Brownian motion independent of $W^y_t$, which generates idiosyncratic shocks specific to the emerging firm, defined on the probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$. The standard filtration of $W^x_i$ is $F = \{\mathcal{F}_t : t \geq 0\}$. The representative firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is denoted by $\sigma_x$. Finally, the growth rate $\theta_{x,i}$ is defined by

$$
\theta_{x,i} = \tilde{\theta}_{x,i} + \theta_{x,c} C, \quad i = \{L, H\} \tag{3}
$$

where $\tilde{\theta}_{x,i}$ is the growth rate of output that prevails in the country in the absence of sovereign debt. The growth rate is lower in recession than in normal times, such that $\theta_{x,H} - \theta_{x,L} = \tilde{\theta}_{x,H} - \tilde{\theta}_{x,L} = \Delta \theta > 0$. While Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009a,b), and Chen (2009) assume the regime is Markov, I model the change of the regime as an endogenous decision of the government. I also assume that sovereign borrowing enhances economic growth through higher productivity growth, with $\theta_{x,c} > 0$.\(^{10}\) The fostering of economic growth is thus the government’s motivation to issue debt of coupon payment $C$.

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\(^{10}\)Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2004) analyze 61 developing countries over the period 1969-1998 and find strong empirical support for the impact of debt on economic growth, in particular through total factor productivity growth.
2.3 Investor Preferences and Consumption

The representative household has logarithmic preferences, which allow for closed-form solutions for consumption allocations and the terms of trade, as well as ensure a constant marginal rate of substitution between goods. There is heterogeneity in consumer tastes to capture the possible home bias in the consumption baskets. The weights of the emerging good in the utility function of the emerging country and the developed country are expressed by $a_x$ and $a_y$, respectively.

I determine the equilibrium allocation by solving the world social planner’s problem to ensure Pareto optimality and follow Pavlova and Rigobon (2007). The initial wealth of the representative household of each country is such that the central-planning welfare function allocates weights of $\lambda_x$ and $\lambda_y \equiv 1 - \lambda_x$ to the utility levels of the households of the emerging and the developed country, respectively. Accordingly, the planner chooses country consumption so as to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities of the representative agents:

$$U \equiv \max E_t \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \lambda_x \{a_x \log(C_{xx,t}) + (1 - a_x) \log(C_{xy,t})\} \, dt$$

subject to the resource constraints

$$C_{xx,t} + C_{yx,t} = X_t$$

$$C_{yy,t} + C_{xy,t} = Y_t$$

where $\rho$ is the rate of time preference, and $C_{kl,t}$ denotes consumption of good $l$ by the representative agent of country $k$. The optimal allocation of consumption is determined by

$$C_{xx,t} = \frac{\lambda_x a_x}{\lambda_y a_y + \lambda_x a_x} X_t, \quad C_{yx,t} = \frac{\lambda_y a_y}{\lambda_y a_y + \lambda_x a_x} X_t,$$

$$C_{xy,t} = \frac{\lambda_x (1 - a_x)}{\lambda_y (1 - a_y) + \lambda_x (1 - a_x)} Y_t, \quad C_{yy,t} = \frac{\lambda_y (1 - a_y)}{\lambda_y (1 - a_y) + \lambda_x (1 - a_x)} Y_t$$

The prices per unit of the emerging good $X$ and the developed good $Y$ are denoted by $P_x$ and $P_y$, respectively. I fix the world numéraire basket to be a Cobb-Douglas function of quantities of good $Y$. 

9
and \( X \) with weights \( \alpha \) and \( 1 - \alpha \), respectively. I normalize the price of this basket \( P_x^{1-\alpha}P_y^\alpha \) as equal to unity.\(^{11}\)

### 2.4 The Exchange Rate

Following Dumas (1992), the real exchange rate \( S \) is then expressed by the ratio of either country’s marginal utilities of the emerging and developed goods (see Appendix 7.1):\(^{12}\)

\[
S_t = \frac{P_{y,t}}{P_{x,t}} = \frac{\lambda_y \frac{\partial u_y(C_{yy,t},C_{yx,t})}{\partial C_{yy,t}}}{\lambda_x \frac{\partial u_x(C_{xx,t},C_{xy,t})}{\partial C_{xx,t}}} = \frac{X_t}{Y_t} \tag{10}
\]

with

\[
X = \frac{\lambda_y (1 - a_y) + \lambda_x (1 - a_x)}{\lambda_x a_x + \lambda_y a_y} \tag{11}
\]

From Itô’s lemma, the exchange rate \( S \) follows the process

\[
\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \theta_{s,i} dt + \sigma_x dW_t^x - \sigma_y dW_t^y, \quad i = \{L, H\} \tag{12}
\]

with

\[
\theta_{s,i} = r_{s,i} - r + \sigma_x^2 \tag{13}
\]

The mean appreciation rate \( \theta_s \) is the difference between the emerging risk-free interest rate and the developed risk-free interest rate \( r_x = \rho + \theta_x - \sigma_x^2 \) and \( r_y = \rho + \theta_y - \sigma_y^2 \), respectively, augmented by some compensation for bearing aggregate output risk.\(^{13}\) When a country experiences an output shock, the exchange rate adjusts exactly to offset any net payoff. This exchange rate satisfies the no-arbitrage conditions, which prove the redundancy of having a risk-free bond in each country. The exchange rate plays an important role in linking asset prices in the two countries. While the key drivers of the level

\(^{11}\)As an alternative world numéraire basket, one could use \( \alpha Y + (1 - \alpha) X \) with \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \), and normalize the price of this basket to be equal to unity. This basket is certainly more intuitive than the basket suggested in this paper, but unfortunately much less tractable when computing asset prices. In both cases, the developed good becomes the numéraire when setting \( \alpha = 0 \).

\(^{12}\)In competitive equilibrium, the price of one unit of the emerging good to be delivered at time \( t \) in state \( w \) is \( \xi^*_t = P_{y,t} \xi \) and the price of one unit of the developed good to be delivered at time \( t \) in state \( w \) is \( \xi^*_t = P_{x,t} \xi \), where \( \xi \) is the state-price density in unit of the world numéraire (see Appendix 7.1). Therefore, consistent with Backus et al. (2001), Brandt et al. (2006), and Bakshi et al. (2008), the exchange rate can also be expressed as the ratio of \( \xi^*_y \) and \( \xi^*_x \). Given the preferences of agents, prices are unique, as is the ratio of the two.

\(^{13}\)There exists only one risk-free asset, namely, the developed country’s government bond denominated in the developed good. As such, the risk-free rate \( r_x \) represents the rate of return on this risk-free bond when measured in units of the emerging good.
of the exchange rate are the relative preferences for goods and the central planner’s welfare weights, the
dynamics (i.e., time-variation) of the exchange rate solely depend on the dynamics of macroeconomic
fundamentals.

### 2.4.1 International Transmission of Production Shocks

Within the model, the propagation of shocks from one country to another arises from a Ricardian
response to economic shocks. To see this, consider a negative shock in the developed country. This shock
is accompanied by an improvement of the terms of trade \( S = \frac{P_y}{P_x} \) because the developed good becomes
relatively rare (i.e., \( P_y \) increases). However, the improvement in the terms of trade implies a decrease in
the relative price of the emerging good \( P_x \) in unit of the world numéraire, leading to a fall in the value
of the emerging country’s output \( P_x X \), although output \( X \) remains unchanged. Firm revenues in both
countries move in the same direction in response to an economic shock in one of the countries despite the
independence of the output innovations of a country.\(^{14}\) Therefore, a contraction of economic growth in
the emerging economy is predicted to have strong effects on firm revenues \( P_y Y \) in the developed economy.

### 2.5 State-Price Density

The state-price density \( \xi \) can be used to compute prices of any contingent asset, irrespective of the
good in which the asset is denominated. It will thus be used to evaluate sovereign debt and the firm
assets in both countries. It follows the process defined by (see Appendix 7.3)

\[
\frac{d\xi_t}{\xi_t} = -r_z,i dt - \sigma_{z,y} dW^y_t - \sigma_{z,x} dW^x_t, \quad i = \{L, H\}
\]  

where \( r_z \) is the risk-free rate prevailing under the world basket numéraire, given by

\[
r_{z,i} = \rho + \theta_{z,i} - (\sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2)
\]  

and

\[
\theta_{z,i} = \theta_{x,i} - \alpha \theta_{s,i} + \frac{\alpha(1 + \alpha)}{2} (\sigma_{x}^2 + \sigma_{y}^2) - \alpha \sigma_{x}^2
\]

\[
\sigma_{z,x} = (1 - \alpha) \sigma_x
\]

\(^{14}\)This result follows Helpman and Razin (1978), Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Zapatero (1995), and Pavlova and Rigobon
(2007, 2008). A natural implication of this prediction is the co-movement in international equity markets, which is docu-
mented by Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), Hartmann, Straetmans,
and de Vries (2004), and Andersen et al. (2007), among others.
\[ \sigma_{z,y} = \alpha \sigma_{y} \]  

(18)

The state-price density is driven by the same set of shocks that drive aggregate output in the developed and the emerging countries. As systematic shocks affect the marginal utility of investors through today’s consumption levels, the risk price of these shocks rises with economic volatility. A higher level of uncertainty, or a lower economic growth rate, then induces greater demand for the risk-free government bond. This flight-to-quality response lowers the risk-free interest rate in periods of distress.

2.6 The Government of the Emerging Country

The government of the emerging country raises fiscal revenues by taxing the value of the emerging firm’s earnings at the tax rate \( \tau \) net of the tax-deductible debt service of the firm. The capacity to service this debt depends on the dynamics of the government revenues

\[ R = \tau (Z - K - C_f) \geq 0, \]

where \( Z \equiv P x X \) denotes the emerging firm’s revenues; \( K \) is the firm’s operating costs per unit of time (e.g., constant wages paid to workers); and \( \tau C_f \) is the firm’s tax-shield. All variables are measured in units of the world basket. From Itô’s formula, the emerging firm’s revenues satisfy (see Appendix 7.2)

\[ \frac{dZ_t}{Z_t} = \theta_{z,i} dt + \sigma_{z,x} dW^x_t + \sigma_{z,y} dW^y_t, \quad i = \{L, H\} \]  

(19)

The sovereign defaults on its debt obligation when the fiscal revenues cannot meet the required coupon payment \( C \), such that \( R = \tau (Z - K - C_f) \leq C \). In contrast to corporations, sovereigns are unable to issue additional financial claims to cover a revenue shortage. In addition, agents of the economy are unwilling to forego part of consumption to finance the government budget deficit. Therefore, the sovereign defaults when the firm’s revenues fall below the endogenous default boundary

\[ Z^D = \frac{C}{\tau} + K + C_f \]  

(20)

at time \( T(Z^D) = \inf \{t \geq 0 \mid Z_t \leq Z^D\} \). The default boundary \( Z^D \) characterizes the sovereign’s default policy, which is Pareto optimal from market completeness. The likelihood of defaulting increases when the emerging firm’s output decreases and/or when the terms of trade depreciate. The sovereign is also more likely to default and trigger a contraction in economic growth when the level of sovereign debt \( C \),

\[ \text{Sovereigns do not tend to default once but several times (Reinhart et al., 2003). Generalizing the framework to account for multiple defaults is left for future research.} \]

\[ \text{Hilscher and Nosbusch (2009) and the references therein show empirical evidence that terms of trade fluctuations are a significant predictor of sovereign credit spread and, thus, of the probability of defaulting. Recent examples are found in Russia and Ecuador, where falling export prices (e.g., oil prices) led to a deterioration of the macroeconomic and fiscal conditions and a sovereign default in 1998 and 1999, respectively.} \]
the firm’s operating costs $K$, and the firm’s level of debt $C_f$ are high, and when the level of tax rate $\tau$ is low.\footnote{Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2004) find the relationship between sovereign debt and growth to be nonlinear (the “debt Laffer curve”): for low levels of debt, greater debt fosters growth; but for high levels of debt, additional debt has negative impact on growth through the increased likelihood that in the future debt will be larger than the country’s repayment ability (the “debt overhang” effect).
}

### 2.6.1 The Price of Sovereign Debt

The lenders anticipate the behavior of the sovereign and reflect the associated wealth loss in the pricing of the sovereign debt. They require a risk-free rate of return $r_z$ per unit of time, which corresponds to the return on the developed country’s default-free bond measured in the world basket. The sovereign pays a constant total coupon $C$ at each moment in time. All terms in the debt contract are denominated in units of the world basket. Upon defaulting, the sovereign and its lenders restructure the terms of the debt contract and agree on a reduction $0 \leq \phi \leq 1$ of the debt service.\footnote{For simplicity, the recovery rate is assumed to be exogenous. Alternatively, Yue (2006) and Jeanneret (2009) develop a model that accounts for endogenous renegotiation upon default. Once default occurs, the sovereign country and its lenders renegotiate the terms of their debt contracts, which determine the recovery rate. The outcome of the restructuring process involves a Nash bargaining solution. However, the consideration of an endogenous recovery rate would not change the results of this paper.} I assume, for simplicity, that the sovereign cannot scale up its debt after default. The value of sovereign debt is (see Appendix 7.4)

$$D(Z) = E_Q^0 \left[ \int_0^{T(Z^D)} C e^{-r_z \cdot u^t dt} \right] + E_Q^0 \left[ \int_{T(Z^D)}^{\infty} (1 - \phi) C e^{-r_z \cdot u^t dt} \right]$$

(21)

The first term is equal to the present value of the promised cash flows $C$ to debtholders until default. The second term corresponds to the present value of the recovered value of the debt after the government has defaulted. Finally, the market credit spread until sovereign default is determined by

$$CS(Z) = \frac{C}{D(Z)} - r_z$$

(22)

### 2.6.2 Economic Conditions and Sovereign Credit Risk

A negative output shock in the developed country is transmitted internationally through a terms of trade response and, thus, decreases the emerging firm’s revenues $Z$. The reduction in taxable corporate income in the emerging country reduces the level of fiscal revenues $R = \tau (Z - K - C_f)$ necessary to service the sovereign debt $C$, which raises the likelihood of defaulting and thus the sovereign credit spread $CS$. Sovereign credit risk is thus high during adverse economic conditions in either the developed or the emerging country.
2.7 The Firm

In this section, I determine the value of the firms’ assets, which depend on whether the firms default before or after the government defaults. The evaluation of the representative firms in the emerging and the developed countries are obtained under identical assumptions. However, the value of the assets differs across countries because of heterogeneous levels of leverage \( C_f \) and operating costs \( K \).

I assume that the management acts in the best interests of the shareholders. I consider an exogenous infinite-maturity debt structure in a stationary environment. One the one hand, the perpetuity feature is shared with numerous other models, including those presented in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994), and Strebulaev (2007). On the other hand, the level of debt is assumed to be exogenous because most of the time firm leverage deviates from “optimal leverage”.\(^{19}\) I first discuss the firm value upon default, then derive the values of corporate debt and equity, and finally determine the default thresholds selected by shareholders.

2.7.1 Firm Value in Default

The shareholders strategically declare default on their debt obligation when the firm’s revenues \( Z \) fall below the default boundary \( Z^{D_f}_t \) at time \( T(Z^{D_f}_t) = \inf \{ t \geq 0 \mid Z_t \leq Z^{D_f}_t \} \). For the developed firm, the revenues \( \overline{SZ} \) replace the emerging firm’s revenues \( Z \).\(^{20}\) I follow Mello and Parsons (1992) and Leland (1994) by presuming that the value of the firm upon default is \( (1 - \eta)V_u(Z^{D_f}_f) \), where \( \eta \in (0, 1) \) is the fraction of asset value lost in default, and \( V_u(Z^{D_f}_f) \) is the value of the unlevered firm’s assets.

2.7.2 Valuation of Firm Debt

I start by determining the value of corporate debt for a given default boundary. The debt is denominated in the world basket and has value equal to the sum of the present value of the earnings that accrue to debtholders until the default time and the change in this present value that arises in default. The expected value of the firm’s cash flows is discounted with the world risk-free rate \( r_z \) under the risk-neutral probability measure. The risk-neutral measure \( Q \) adjusts for risks by changing the distributions of shocks.

Cash flows are risky for an investor when they are positively correlated with its marginal utility, which is accounted for by lowering the expected growth rate under \( Q \) (see Appendix 7.2.1).

\(^{19}\)For reference, see Strebulaev (2007) and Bhamra et al. (2009b). Because of issuance costs, most firms optimally refinance only periodically. Hence, as shown by Strebulaev (2007), if leverage deviates from its target substantially, then the response of firms to changes in economic conditions will not be in line with the predictions of comparative statics at refinancing points.

\(^{20}\)Under the world basket numéraire, the revenues of the developed firm are \( P_y Y = \overline{SZ} \), while those of the emerging revenues are \( P_x X = Z \).
The value of the developed firm’s debt is (see Appendix 7.5.1)

\[ D_f(Z) \big|_{T^- \leq T^+} = E_0^Q \left[ \int_0^{T^-} C_f e^{-r_{z,h} t} dt + e^{-r_{z,ft} T^-} D_f(Z) \big|_{t=T^-} \right] \]  

(23)

with

\[ D_f(Z) \big|_{t=T^-} = E_{T^-}^Q \left[ \int_{T^-}^{T^+} C_f 1_{[T(Z^D_f) > T(Z^D)]} e^{-r_{z,lt} t} dt \right] \]  

(24)

\[ + E_{T^-}^Q \left[ \int_{T^-}^{T^+} (1-\eta)(1-\tau) (Z_t - K) 1_{[T(Z^D_f) \leq T(Z^D)]} e^{-r_{z,lt} t} dt \right] \]  

(25)

\[ + E_{T^-}^Q \left[ \int_{T^+}^{\infty} (1-\eta)(1-\tau) (Z_t - K) e^{-r_{z,lt} t} dt \right] \]  

(26)

where \( T^+ = T \left( Z^D_f \right) \lor T \left( Z^D \right) \), \( T^- = T \left( Z^D_f \right) \land T \left( Z^D \right) \), and \( 1_{[a]} \) is an indicator function equals to one if the function \( a \) is true and zero, otherwise. Consider, for example, that the firm defaults after the emerging government defaults, such that \( T \left( Z^D_f \right) > T \left( Z^D \right) \), \( T^+ = T \left( Z^D_f \right) \), and \( T^- = T \left( Z^D \right) \). The value of debt is determined by the present value of the promised coupon payment \( C_f \) discounted at the risk-free rate \( r_{z,h} \) until sovereign default plus the present value of debt at the time of sovereign default \( D_f(Z) \big|_{t=T^-} \). The value of debt at the time of sovereign default is equal to the present value of the promised coupon payment \( C_f \) discounted at the risk-free rate \( r_{z,l} \) until the firm defaults and plus the value of the firm upon liquidation, which is determined by the unlevered firm value net of liquidation costs.

2.7.3 Total Firm Value

The total value of the levered firm equals the unlimited liability value of a perpetual claim to the current flow of after-tax earnings \( (1-\tau) (Z_t - K) \), plus the present value of a perpetual claim to the current flow of tax benefits of debt \( \tau C_f \), minus the change in those present values arising in default due to the liquidation costs \( \eta \). Thus, the levered firm value \( V(Z) \) satisfies (see Appendix 7.5.2)

\[ V(Z) \big|_{T^- \leq T^+} = E_0^Q \left[ \int_0^{T^-} ((1-\tau) (Z_t - K) + \tau C_f) e^{-r_{z,lt} t} dt \right] \]  

(27)

\[ + E_0^Q \left[ e^{-r_{z,lt} T^-} V(Z) \big|_{t=T^-} \right] \]  

(28)
with

\[
V(Z) \big|_{t=T^-} = \mathbb{E}^Q_{T^-} \left[ \int_{T^-}^{T^+} ((1 - \tau) (Z_t - K) + \tau C_f) \mathbf{1}_{[T(Z^D_f) > T(Z^D_g)]} e^{-r_z, L_t} dt \right] 
\]

\[
+ \mathbb{E}^Q_{T^-} \left[ \int_{T^-}^{T^+} (1 - \eta) (1 - \tau) (Z_t - K) \mathbf{1}_{[T(Z^D_f) \leq T(Z^D_g)]} e^{-r_z, H_t} dt \right] 
\]

\[
+ \mathbb{E}^Q_{T^-} \left[ \int_{T^-}^\infty (1 - \eta) (1 - \tau) (Z_t - K) e^{-r_z, L_t} dt \right] 
\]

\[
(29)
\]

In the absence of arbitrage, the levered firm value equals the sum of debt and equity values. Hence, the value of the firm’s equity \( E(Z) \) is determined by

\[
E(Z) \big|_{T^- \leq T^+} = V(Z) \big|_{T^- \leq T^+} - D_f(Z) \big|_{T^- \leq T^+} 
\]

(32)

2.7.4 The Firm’s Decision to Default

Within the model, markets are frictionless, and default is triggered by the shareholder decision to optimally cease injecting funds into the firm; see also Leland (1998) and Morellec (2004). The firm’s default policy is characterized by the default boundary \( Z^D_f \big|_{T^- \leq T^+} \) and maximizes the shareholder value such that the smooth-pasting condition \( \frac{\partial [E(Z) \big|_{T^- \leq T^+}]}{\partial Z} \big|_{Z = Z^D_f \big|_{T^- \leq T^+}} = 0 \) is satisfied (see Appendix 7.5.3 for the value of \( Z^D_f \)). The decision to default before or after the government is determined \( \text{ex ante} \) to maximize the shareholder value. The optimal default boundary thus satisfies

\[
Z^D_f = \begin{cases} 
Z^D_f \big|_{T(Z^D_f) \leq T(Z^D_g)} & \text{if } E(Z) \big|_{T(Z^D_f) \leq T(Z^D_g)} \geq E(Z) \big|_{T(Z^D_f) > T(Z^D_g)} \\
Z^D_f \big|_{T(Z^D_g) \leq T(Z^D_f)} & \text{if } E(Z) \big|_{T(Z^D_g) \leq T(Z^D_f)} < E(Z) \big|_{T(Z^D_g) > T(Z^D_f)} 
\end{cases} 
\]

(33)

The above rule determines the conditions under which the firm defaults before or after the government. The model predicts that the firm tends to default first when i) the firm is relatively more leveraged than the government (i.e., high \( C_f \) and low \( C \)); ii) the firm has large operating costs (i.e., high \( K \)); iii) the loss of economic growth rate upon the change of regime is important (i.e., high \( \Delta \theta \)); iv) volatility in either country’s economic fundamentals is low (i.e., low \( \sigma_x \) and \( \sigma_y \)); v) either economy grows rapidly (i.e., high \( \theta_x \) and \( \theta_y \)); and finally, vi) when the corporate tax burden is severe (i.e., high \( \tau \)).
3 Theoretical Predictions on Equity Return Volatility

This section uses the model developed in this paper to analyze the drivers of equity return volatility in the developed country. The volatility of a firm’s equity returns is given by (see Appendix 7.5.4)

\[ \sigma_{E(Z)} = \frac{\partial E(Z)}{\partial Z} Z \sqrt{\sigma^2_{z,x} + \sigma^2_{z,y}} > \sigma_z \]  

Equity return volatility is predicted to depend negatively on the growth rates of output in both countries \( \theta_x \) and \( \theta_y \), and on the corporate tax rate \( \tau \). However, equity return volatility is predicted to rise with increasing macroeconomic volatilities of both countries \( \sigma_x \) and \( \sigma_y \), financial leverage \( C_f \), operational costs \( K \), and sovereign indebtedness \( C \). A negative economic shock also reduces the developed firm’s earnings \( Z \), which increases the volatility of equity returns. Equity return volatility is thus countercyclical, which is in line with the empirical findings of Schwert (1989), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bae et al. (2003), Engle and Rangel (2008), and Engle, Ghysels, and Sohn (2009), among others. In addition, the level of equity return volatility is greater than the volatility of the firm’s revenues \( \sigma_z = \sqrt{\sigma^2_{z,x} + \sigma^2_{z,y}} \).

The countercyclical nature and the high level of equity return volatility arise from three effects. First, the presence of corporate debt generates the financial leverage introduced by Black (1976) and Christie (1982). When afflicted by a negative output shock, the value of a firm declines, which raises the probability of defaulting and lowers the value of equity (i.e., the junior claim) relative to the value of debt (i.e., the senior claim). The increase in the firm’s financial leverage raises the volatility of equity returns. Second, the presence of constant production costs \( K \) borne by the firm generates an operational leverage effect. Lev (1974) demonstrated early on that the presence of operating leverage raises the volatility of a firm’s earnings, thereby increasing a firm’s equity return volatility, as well.

The model suggests a third channel: the presence of sovereign default risk additionally raises the sensitivity of equity returns to economic shocks, which is due to the risk of a drop in firm earning growth upon the change of macroeconomic regime. When there is a risk that the emerging country enters a recession, which is triggered in the model through a sovereign default in that country, firms in both countries experience a decrease in the present value of their revenues, thereby depressing the value of their equity and increasing the volatility of their equity returns. The model accounts for all three effects.
Table 1: **Parameter Choices.** This table presents the parameter values adopted for the estimation and simulation. All variables are annualized when applicable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time preference</td>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Author’s assumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference of the emerging agents for the emerging good</td>
<td>$a_x$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Author’s assumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference of the developed agents for the emerging good</td>
<td>$a_y$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Author’s assumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central planner’s weight for the emerging country</td>
<td>$\lambda_x$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Author’s assumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developed country</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>$\theta_y$</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Average growth rate of industrial production in the U.S. (1998-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>$\sigma_y$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Growth rate volatility of industrial production in the U.S. (1998-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial level of production</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>[Normalization]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emerging country</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed growth rate</td>
<td>$\bar{\theta}_x$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Match average growth rate of industrial production in Brazil (1998-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable growth rate</td>
<td>$\theta_{x,c}$</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>Match average growth rate of industrial production in Brazil (1998-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>$\sigma_x$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Growth rate volatility of industrial production in Brazil (1998-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial level of production</td>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>[Normalization]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government debt</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt service</td>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Match Debt/GDP for Brazil (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haircut</td>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Moody’s (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt service in emerging country</td>
<td>$C_f$</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Match leverage ratio in Brazil (Lins, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt service in developed country</td>
<td>$C_{fy}$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Match leverage ratio in U.S. (Morellec et al., 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed costs in emerging country</td>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Match leverage ratio in Brazil (Lins, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed costs in developed country</td>
<td>$K_y$</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Match leverage ratio in U.S. (Morellec et al., 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankruptcy costs</td>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Morellec et al. (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax rate</td>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Morellec et al. (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1 Calibration

I now calibrate the model and provide simulation analysis to illustrate how the model helps explain the level of equity return volatility in the U.S. In the empirical analysis of this paper, the U.S. represents the large developed country, while Brazil represents the emerging country. Brazil is a natural candidate because it is a large trading partner of the U.S. with sizable sovereign credit risk. In addition, the data on sovereign credit spreads, stock market prices, and industrial production for Brazil cover a longer period than for any other emerging country. I calibrate the model for the means and the standard deviations of the developed and the emerging countries’ output growths to be equal the U.S. and Brazilian annual growth rates of industrial production, respectively, over the period from June 1994 through December 2008. The parameter values related to firms are chosen to match the characteristics of representative firms in the U.S. and Brazil, and those related to sovereign debt match the indebtedness level of the government in Brazil. The parameter values related to agents’ preferences and central planner weights are chosen arbitrarily, as they affect neither the value nor the dynamics of the assets. The parameter values are presented in Table 1.

3.2 Equity Return Volatility and Economic Shocks

The explanation of the level of equity return volatility is given by Figure 2, which provides an illustration of the sensitivity of equity return volatility to economic shocks. The benchmark case is Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), which is essentially the model developed within this paper in the absence of defaultable debt in a firm’s balance sheet, of operating costs, or of the risk of a sovereign default crisis. In that case, the return on equity is equal to the growth rate of the developed firm’s revenues, which is less than the growth rate in output because of the offsetting terms of trade effect. Therefore, volatility of this firm’s equity return is equal to the volatility of its revenues. As illustrated in Figure 2, the level of equity return volatility severely increases i) when the firm is levered, ii) when there are operating costs, and finally iii) when there is a risk of sovereign default in the emerging country. While the effect of the risk of economic contraction upon sovereign default on the level of equity return volatility is marginal in period of economic growth, this effect appears to be particularly strong during adverse economic conditions.
Figure 2: Equity Return Volatility, Economic Shocks, and Leverage Effects. This figure shows the effect of economic conditions on the level of equity return volatility, which depends on the presence of financial leverage, of operational leverage, and of sovereign default risk. Equity return volatility is determined by $\sigma_{E(Z)} = \frac{\partial E(Z)}{E(Z)} \sqrt{\sigma^2_{z,x} + \sigma^2_{z,y}}$. The parameters of the models are those presented in Table 1 with $\Delta \theta = 0.002$.

The contribution of the model resides in the prediction that a higher level of sovereign credit risk increases the level of equity return volatility in both countries. Section 4 provides a structural estimation of the model and tests whether the presence of the expected loss in economic growth upon sovereign default helps explain the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. beyond the financial and operational leverage effects. In addition, the model suggests that sovereign credit risk in the emerging country and equity return volatility in the developed country are countercyclical, as they are determined endogenously by the same economic shocks. Sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets and equity return volatility in the U.S. should then be positively related. An empirical analysis in Section 5 provides strong support for this prediction.

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21 Alternative explanations of the countercyclicality of equity return volatility include Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Tauchen (2005). These authors argue that investors with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty require compensation, thereby inducing negative co-movements between ex-post returns and volatility. Some models on limited equity market participation such as Basak and Cuoco (1998) are also able to generate asymmetric equity return volatility movements.

22 Alternatively, the introduction of portfolio constraints can also increase equity return volatility. For example, Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) show that the presence of a constraint that limits the fraction of wealth at a country’s agents may invest in the assets of the other country amplifies the asset price reaction to economic shocks.
The model developed in this paper is based on the assumption that a sovereign default event triggers a local contraction in economic growth, which is then transmitted internationally through the foreign exchange market. The expected loss in economic growth upon default, captured by $\Delta \theta$, is predicted to internationally affect asset valuation and, in particular, the volatility of international equity returns. In this section, I provide a structural test of this hypothesis and estimate the expected loss in economic growth $\Delta \theta$ upon sovereign default using the general method of moments. I use monthly industrial production data for Brazil and the U.S. to generate the equity prices predicted by the model and the moment conditions. I show that this expected loss in economic growth helps explain the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. and Brazil over the past 15 years. I first discuss the estimation approach and then present the results.

4.1 Data

Financial data for this section consist of the S&P500 for the U.S. equity price index, MSCI Brazil for the Brazilian equity price index (measured in U.S. dollars), the JPMorgan EMBI+ spreads Brazil for sovereign credit spreads in Brazil, and finally the CBOE option-implied volatility index on the S&P500. Data are taken from two sources, namely, i) Datastream for equity and bond market indices and for the U.S. dollars/Brazilian Reals exchange rate, and ii) Bloomberg for the EMBI+ spreads. All series consist of daily or monthly observations from June 1, 1994, to December 31, 2008.

4.2 GMM Estimation and the Choice of Moments

This section describes the econometric approach that I use to estimate the parameter of interest, $\Delta \theta$. The goal is to examine whether the expected loss in economic growth upon a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets has an international influence on the level and volatility of equity returns. The econometric approach consists of testing a set of overidentifying restrictions on a system of moment equations using the generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Hansen (1982). The moments under consideration are the mean and variance of the equity returns in both the developed country and the emerging country. In comparison to the Maximum Likelihood estimation, the GMM technique is particularly attractive for an estimation of this type of asset pricing model. First, the GMM approach does not require that the distribution of equity returns or equity return volatility be normal; second, the asymptotic justification for the GMM procedure requires only that the distribution of equity return and equity return volatility be stationary and ergodic and that the relevant expectations exist.
the GMM estimators and their standard errors are consistent even if the assumed disturbances are conditionally heteroskedastic.

The GMM estimation procedure chooses the parameter estimates that minimize the quadratic form

\[ J(\Delta \theta) = m'(\Delta \theta)W(\Delta \theta)m(\Delta \theta) \]

with

\[
m(\Delta \theta) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} (r_{us,t} \cdot r_{E_{fy},t}(\Delta \theta)) \\
\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} (r_{br,t} \cdot r_{E_{f},t}(\Delta \theta)) \\
\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} \left[ (r_{us,t} - \bar{r}_{us})^2 - (r_{E_{fy},t}(\Delta \theta) - \bar{r}_{E_{fy},t}(\Delta \theta))^2 \right] \\
\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} \left[ (r_{br,t} - \bar{r}_{br})^2 - (r_{E_{f},t}(\Delta \theta) - \bar{r}_{E_{f},t}(\Delta \theta))^2 \right]
\end{cases}
\]

where \( m(\Delta \theta) \) is a vector of orthogonality conditions, and \( W(\Delta \theta) \) is a positive-definite symmetric weighting matrix. Because I consider more moment conditions than parameters, not all of the moment restrictions are satisfied. The weighting matrix \( W(\Delta \theta) \) determines the relative importance of the various moment conditions so as to give more weight to the moment conditions with less uncertainty. Following Hansen (1982), when equal to the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix, the weighting matrix \( W(\Delta \theta) = S^{-1}(\Delta \theta) \) is optimal because \( \hat{\Delta \theta} \) is determined with the smallest asymptotic variance. I estimate the covariance matrix using the Newey and West (1987) approach to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation with a correction for small samples. This covariance matrix is used to test the significance of the parameter.

The optimal weighting matrix \( W(\Delta \theta) \) requires an estimate of the parameter \( \Delta \theta \); at the same time, estimating the parameter \( \Delta \theta \) requires the weighting matrix. To solve this dependency, I account for a two-stage estimation method. I first set the initial weighting matrix to be equal to the identity matrix \( W_0 = I \) and then calculate the parameter estimate. I then compute a new weighting matrix with the parameter estimate obtained at the first stage. The parameter \( \Delta \theta \) is obtained by matching the moments of the model to those of the data as closely as possible.

### 4.3 Empirical Results

In this section, I present the empirical results and examine the explanatory power of the asset-pricing model developed in this paper. Table 2 reports the parameter estimate, the asymptotic standard
deviations and their associated p-values, and the GMM minimized criterion ($\chi^2$ ) values.

Table 2: Results of the Model Estimation. This table provides the results of the model estimation using the general method of moments. The moments under consideration are the mean and the variance of equity returns in the U.S. and in Brazil. Equity returns in the U.S., $r_{us}$, are computed with the S&P500 and equity returns in Brazil, $r_{br}$, are computed with the MSCI Brazil Index. I use monthly industrial production data for Brazil and the U.S. from June 1994 through December 2008 to generate the equity prices predicted by the model and the moment conditions. I estimate the expected economic costs $\Delta \theta$ of a sovereign default to match the moments as closely as possible. The remaining parameter values are presented in Table 1. The heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, presented in parenthesis, are corrected for serial correlation using the Newey and West’s non-parametric variance covariance estimator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment conditions</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>GMM parameter estimates and J-test</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developed country: U.S.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Parameter estimate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average equity return</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>$\Delta \theta$</td>
<td>0.2132</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} (r_{us,t} - \bar{r}<em>{E</em>{fy},t})$</td>
<td>(0.0034)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity return volatility</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} \left[ (r_{us,t} - \bar{r}<em>{us})^2 - (r</em>{E_{fy},t} - \bar{r}<em>{E</em>{fy}})^2 \right]$</td>
<td>(0.0092)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emerging country: Brazil</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Test of over-identifying restrictions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average equity return</td>
<td>-0.0061</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>$J(\Phi_1)$</td>
<td>8.383</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} (r_{br,t} - \bar{r}<em>{E</em>{f},t})$</td>
<td>(0.0082)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity return volatility</td>
<td>0.0168</td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>$N = 176$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^{N} \left[ (r_{br,t} - \bar{r}<em>{br})^2 - (r</em>{E_{f},t} - \bar{r}<em>{E</em>{f}})^2 \right]$</td>
<td>(0.0549)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, it is worth analyzing how well the model fits the data. As the model is over-identified, it is not possible to set every moment to zero. Therefore, the key concern is the distance from zero. The minimized value of the quadratic form $J(\Delta \theta)$ is $\chi^2$-distributed under the null hypothesis that the model is true with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of orthogonality conditions net of the number of parameters to be estimated. This $\chi^2$ measure thus provides a goodness-of-fit test for the model.

The $\chi^2$ tests for goodness-of-fit suggest that the model cannot be rejected at the 90% confidence level (see Table 2). The table uses the covariance matrix of the moments to test the significance of individual moments and provides the corresponding p-values. Table 2 suggests that the estimate of $\Delta \theta$ is statistically different from zero. Therefore, the adverse economic consequences of a recession due to a sovereign default crisis explain the volatility of international equity returns beyond the financial leverage effect studied by Black (1976) and Christie (1982) and the operational leverage effect documented by
Lev (1974). Moreover, we cannot reject the fact that the moment conditions are not satisfied at the 90% confidence level. Thus, the model can simultaneously satisfy all moments and is therefore successful in explaining the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S and in Brazil.

To date, the existing international asset pricing literature has largely ignored the presence of defaultable debt in a firm’s balance sheet, operating costs, or the risk of a sovereign default crisis. The prediction is that the volatility of an unlevered firm’s equity return is lower than or equal to the volatility of this firm’s output, depending on whether or not there is an offsetting terms-of-trade effect. However, the data suggest that the volatility of equity returns is far greater than the volatility of output (see Table 3). To date, it has been difficult to offer an adequate response to Shiller’s (1981) critique: stock prices are too volatile to be explained by a simple asset pricing model with dividends or earnings. In contrast, the results of Table 2 show that the model resolves this issue by accounting for financial leverage, operational leverage, and sovereign default risk.

Table 3: Statistics on Industrial Production and Equity Markets, 1994-2008. This table compares the mean and the standard deviation (volatility) of industrial production's growth with the mean and the volatility of returns on equity market indices for Brazil and the U.S. All values are annualized over the period 1994-2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Production Growth</th>
<th>Equity Market Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean (%) Volatility (%)</td>
<td>Mean (%) Volatility (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil 1.50 7.99 4.68 41.95</td>
<td>United States 2.11 7.49 8.17 15.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, I analyze the magnitude of the loss in output growth due to sovereign default. The results suggest an estimate of 0.21% for Brazil. As Brazil grows at 1.5% per annum (see Table 3), the economic loss upon default corresponds to 13% of the average growth rate. Because this estimate captures the loss in output growth due to the default event in excess of the average growth and not in excess of the relatively weak economic growth at the time of this event, this estimate should be viewed as a lower bound. The magnitude of this estimate is close to that measured by De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006), who looked at the annual difference between potential and actual output, where potential output is based on the country’s pre-crisis (HP filter) trend. Analyzing 45 sovereign default crises over the period of 1970-2000, these authors found a loss in GDP growth of 15.1% per annum.

24Shiller’s (1981) initial findings apply to stock market in the U.S. However, this “excess-volatility” puzzle is confirmed by Campbell (1996) for a number of other countries.
5 Equity Return Volatility and Sovereign Credit Risk

The model predicts a positive relationship between sovereign credit risk in the emerging country and equity return volatility in the developed country. It also offers an intuitive economic explanation of this relationship. Over recent years, the relationship between equity market volatility in the U.S., in particular the option-implied volatility index on the S&P500 (VIX), and sovereign credit spread movements in emerging markets has attracted a great deal of interest. Figure 3 (left panel) displays the dynamics of the VIX and sovereign credit risk in Brazil measured with the JPMorgan EMBI+ sovereign spreads. The right panel of Figure 3 shows that the correlation between these two variables, which is computed using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation model developed by Engle and Sheppard (2001), varies over time but remains consistently positive over the sample period.

![Figure 3: Equity Market Volatility and Sovereign Credit Risk, 1994-2008.](image)

This figure (left panel) compares the option-implied volatility index on the S&P500 (VIX) and the EMBI+ sovereign credit spread for Brazil from June 1, 1994 through December 31, 2008. The right panel plots the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) between these two series computed with the model developed by Engle and Sheppard (2001).

5.1 Equity Return Volatility and Option-implied Volatility

To date, the empirical literature has focused on the relationship between sovereign credit spreads and the VIX, which is a forward-looking measure, rather than on equity return volatility, which is a realized volatility measure. I suggest that the positive correlation between the VIX and sovereign credit risk is mostly attributed to the positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and equity return volatility. First, equity return volatility in the U.S. computed with a GARCH(1,1) model on S&P500 returns is

---

25 See, for example, McGuire and Schrijvers (2003), González-Rozada and Yeyati (2008), Pan and Singleton (2008), Remolona et al. (2008), Hilscher and Nosbusch (2009), and Longstaff et al. (2009).
the key driver of the VIX; it explains 80% of its time variation over the sample period. Second, Figure 4 (left panel) shows a positive relationship between sovereign credit spreads in Brazil and equity return volatility in the U.S. The relationship holds during both the pre-crisis period (1994-2006) and the recent crisis period (2007-2008).\textsuperscript{26}

Figure 4: Equity Return Volatility, Volatility Risk Premum, and Sovereign Credit Risk, 1994-2008. This figure (left panel) compares the volatility on S&P500 returns computed with the GARCH(1,1) model and the EMBI+ sovereign credit spread for Brazil. The figure breaks down the relationship between these series into two subsamples: from June 1, 1994 through December 31, 2006 and from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008. The right panel provides the same analysis but with the volatility risk premium instead of the equity return volatility.

In contrast, the relationship between sovereign credit risk in Brazil and the volatility risk premium, which is the difference between the VIX and return volatility on S&P500, is unclear (see Figure 4, right panel); the correlation between these two measures is positive but weak during the 1994-2006 period; however, it is negative during the subprime crisis period (2007-2008). This rather counterintuitive result arises because the volatility risk premium was negative and large in the fall of 2008 (see Figure 5) when sovereign credit spreads considerably widened (see Figure 3, left panel).\textsuperscript{27}

Therefore, the model developed in this paper can offer an intuitive and economic explanation of the relationship between sovereign credit risk in emerging markets and equity market volatility in the U.S., when measured either with the historical volatility or the option-implied volatility.

\textsuperscript{26}The 2007-2008 crisis period is characterized by sharp increase in the correlation between equity return volatility and sovereign credit spreads in Brazil. This feature is typical in periods of high volatility (i.e., volatility of sovereign credit spread or of equity return volatility), as suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). When accounting for heteroskedasticity in these variables, the increase in conditional correlation displayed in Figure 1 is far more modest. The relatively low level of sovereign credit risk in Brazil during the recent years is certainly due to the important level of foreign reserves and the low level of indebtedness.

\textsuperscript{27}Longstaff et al. (2009) also obtain a negative effect of changes in the volatility risk premium on changes in sovereign credit spreads, when controlling for other country-specific and global factors over the period 2000-2009.
Figure 5: VIX, Equity Return Volatility, and Volatility Risk Premium, 1994-2008. This figure compares the option-implied volatility index on the S&P500 (VIX) with the conditional volatility of S&P500 returns computed with the GARCH(1,1) model from June 1, 1994 through December 31, 2008. The figure also displays the difference between these two measures, which corresponds to the volatility risk premium.

6 Conclusion

This paper shows that the consequences of economic shocks in the U.S. on the U.S. financial market are greater than those predicted today. This analysis is based on a simple concept: a negative economic shock to the U.S. economy also affects its trading partners. In particular, this shock increases the risk of a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets, which triggers a “boomerang effect” that amplifies the negative effect of this initial shock on the U.S. financial markets. In line with the prediction of this paper, sovereign default crises have generally followed a negative economic shock in the U.S. and have thus exacerbated the level of equity return volatility in the U.S. Examples include the 1998 default of Russia after the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, the 2001 default of Argentina after the attack of September 11, the 2002 default in Brazil after the stock market sell-off in July, and the 2008 defaults of Ecuador and Iceland after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

The recent financial crisis has brought into question the diversification benefits of investing across asset classes. This paper offers insights on how governments and firms are closely linked in the economy. In addition, the model predicts strong co-movement among corporate debt, sovereign debt, and the equity markets. The capacity to service sovereign debt and thus to avoid defaulting depends on the level of fiscal revenues determined by the level of the domestic firm earnings. At the same time, the present value of firm earnings depends on the likelihood of entering a recession, which itself depends on the risk of a sovereign default. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the interactions between firm and government
default decisions can yield important new asset pricing predictions.

This paper is also useful in improving our understanding of the drivers of equity return volatility and of its variation over time. For example, the combination of the transmission of shocks through the foreign exchange market and the leverage effects can explain the stylized fact that equity return volatility moves across countries in a coordinated fashion (e.g., Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990), Lin, Engle, and Ito (1994), Edwards and Susmel (2001), Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). Understanding the factors that lead some countries to have higher levels of equity return volatility than those of others is also of crucial importance for international portfolio allocation. The model predicts, for example, that heterogeneity in financial leverage, operational leverage, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the dynamics of the economy can explain the cross-sectional variation in equity return volatility. The framework developed in this paper thus lends itself to numerous international finance implications and extensions for further research.
References


7 Appendix

7.1 The Exchange Rate

The price of one unit of the emerging good to be delivered at time \( t \) in state \( w \) is equal to

\[
\xi_{x,t} = \lambda_x e^{-\rho t} \frac{\partial u_x(C_{xx,t}, C_{xy,t})}{\partial C_{xx,t}}
\]

(37)

\[
= \lambda_x e^{-\rho t} \frac{\partial [a_x \log (C_{xx,t}) + (1 - a_x) \log (C_{xy,t})]}{\partial C_{xx,t}}
\]

(38)

\[
= \frac{\lambda_x e^{-\rho t} a_x}{C_{xx,t}} = \frac{e^{-\rho t} (\lambda_y a_y + \lambda_x a_x)}{X_t} = f(t, X_t)
\]

(39)

Dropping the time and the regime subscript and applying Itô’s formula to \( \xi_{x,t} \) yields,

\[
df(t, X) = f_t dt + f_x dX + \frac{1}{2} f_{xx} dX^2
\]

(40)

\[
= -\rho f dt - \frac{f}{X} (\theta_x X dt + \sigma_x X dW^x) + \frac{f}{X^2} \left[(\sigma_x X)^2 dt\right]
\]

(41)

\[
= f \left[-(\rho - \theta_x + \sigma_x^2) dt + \sigma_x X dW^x\right]
\]

(42)

The price of one unit of the emerging good to be delivered at time \( t \) in state \( w \) thus follows the process defined by

\[
d\xi_{x,t} = -r_x dt - \sigma_x dW^x, \quad i = \{L, H\}
\]

(43)

where \( r_x \) is the risk-free rate prevailing in the emerging country, given by

\[
r_x = \rho + \theta_x - \sigma_x^2
\]

(44)

Using a similar approach to obtain the price of one unit of the developed good to be delivered at time \( t \) in state \( w \), defined by \( \xi_{y,t} = \frac{\lambda_y e^{-\rho t} (1 - a_y)}{C_{yy,t}} \), we obtain

\[
d\xi_{y,t} = -r_y dt - \sigma_y dW^y
\]

(45)

where \( r_y \) is the risk-free rate prevailing in the developed country, given by

\[
r_y = \rho + \theta_y - \sigma_y^2
\]

(46)

Finally, the exchange rate is defined by \( S_t = f(t, \xi_{y,t}, \xi_{x,t}) = \frac{\xi_{y,t}}{\xi_{x,t}} \), which is the same as the ratio of either country’s marginal utilities of the developed good and the emerging good.\(^{28}\) From Itô’s formula,

\(^{28}\) For reference, see Dumas (1992), Backus et al. (2001), Brandt et al. (2006), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007, 2008), and Bakshi et al. (2008).
dropping the time and the regime subscript,

\[ df(t, \xi_y, \xi_x) = f_t dt + f_y d\xi_y + f_x d\xi_x + \frac{1}{2} (f_{\xi_y \xi_y} d\xi_y d\xi_y + f_{\xi_x \xi_x} d\xi_x d\xi_x + 2 f_{\xi_y \xi_x} d\xi_y d\xi_x) \]

\[ = 0 + \frac{1}{\xi_x} \left( -r_y \xi_y dt - \sigma_y \xi_y dW^y \right) \]

\[ - \frac{\xi_y}{(\xi_x)^2} \left( -r_x \xi_x dt - \xi_x \sigma_x dW^x \right) + \frac{\xi_y}{(\xi_x)^3} (\xi_x \sigma_x)^2 dt \]

\[ = \frac{\xi_y}{\xi_x} \left[ \left( r_x - r_y + (\sigma_x)^2 \right) dt + \sigma_x dW^x - \sigma_y dW^y \right] \] (47)

The exchange rate \( S \) thus follows the process defined by

\[ \frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \theta_{s,i} dt + \sigma_x dW^x_t - \sigma_y dW^y_t, \quad i = \{ L, H \} \] (51)

with

\[ \theta_{s,i} = r_{s,i} - r_y + \sigma_x^2 \] (52)

### 7.2 The Dynamics of the Firm Revenues

Let’s define the emerging firm’s revenues as \( f = Z_t = P_{x,t} X_t = (S_t)^{-\alpha} X_t \) (from the world basket numeraire) with

\[ \frac{dX_t}{X_t} = \theta_{x,i} dt + \sigma_x dW^x_t, \quad i = \{ L, H \} \] (53)

and

\[ \frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \theta_{s,i} dt + \sigma_x dW^x_t - \sigma_y dW^y_t, \quad i = \{ L, H \} \] (54)

From Itô’s formula, dropping the time and regime subscripts,

\[ df(t, X_t, S_t) = f_t dt + f_x dX + f_s dS + \frac{1}{2} (f_{xx} dX dX + f_{sx} dS dS + 2 f_{sx} dX dS) \]

\[ = 0 + \tau S^{-\alpha} X \left( \theta_{x,i} dt + \sigma_x dW^x \right) \]

\[ - \alpha \tau S^{-\alpha} X (\theta_{s,i} dt + \sigma_x dW^x - \sigma_y dW^y) \]

\[ + 0 + \frac{\alpha(1 + \alpha)}{2} \tau S^{-\alpha} X (\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_y^2) dt - \alpha \tau S^{-\alpha} X \sigma_x^2 dt \]

\[ = \tau S^{-\alpha} X \left\{ \left[ \theta_x - \alpha \theta_s + \frac{\alpha(1 + \alpha)}{2} \left( \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_y^2 \right) - \alpha \sigma_x^2 \right] dt \right\} + (1 - \alpha) \sigma_x dW^x + \alpha \sigma_y dW^y \] (55)

The dynamics of \( Z_t \) is thus characterized by the process defined by

\[ \frac{dZ_t}{Z_t} = \theta_{z,i} dt + \sigma_{z,x} dW^x_t + \sigma_{z,y} dW^y_t, \quad i = \{ L, H \} \] (60)

with

\[ \theta_{z,i} = \theta_{x,i} - \alpha \theta_{s,i} + \frac{\alpha(1 + \alpha)}{2} \left( \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_y^2 \right) - \alpha \sigma_x^2 \] (61)

\[ \sigma_{z,x} = (1 - \alpha) \sigma_x \] (62)

\[ \sigma_{z,y} = \alpha \sigma_y \] (63)
7.2.1 The Risk-Neutral Measure

Let be \((\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)\) the probability space on which the Brownian motions are defined. The corresponding information filtration is \(F = \{\mathcal{F}_t : t \geq 0\}\).

First, we define the risk-neutral measure associated with the pricing kernel under the world basket numeraire \(\xi_t\) by specifying the density process \(\varphi_t\),

\[\varphi_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{dQ}{dP} \right] \tag{64}\]

which evolves according to the process

\[\frac{d\varphi_t}{\varphi_t} = -\sigma_{z,y} dW^y_t - \sigma_{z,x} dW^x_t \tag{65}\]

Applying the Girsanov theorem, we obtain new Brownian motions under \(Q\), \(\tilde{W}^y_t\) and \(\tilde{W}^x_t\), which solve

\[dW^y_t = d\tilde{W}^y_t - \sigma_{z,y} dt \tag{66}\]
\[dW^x_t = d\tilde{W}^x_t - \sigma_{z,x} dt \tag{67}\]

Under the risk-neutral probability measure \(Q\), the developed and the emerging firm’s revenues then follow the process

\[\frac{dZ_t}{Z_t} = \tilde{\theta}_{z,i} dt + \sigma_{z,x} d\tilde{W}^x_t + \sigma_{z,y} d\tilde{W}^y_t, \quad i = \{L, H\} \tag{68}\]

with

\[\tilde{\theta}_{z,i} = \theta_{z,i} - (\sigma^2_{z,x} + \sigma^2_{z,y}) \tag{69}\]

7.3 The State-Price Density

The state-price density \(\xi_t\) that prevails in a competitive equilibrium is equal to

\[\xi_t = (\xi_t P_x)^{1-\alpha} (\xi_t P_y)^{\alpha} = (\xi_{c,t})^{1-\alpha} (\xi_{y,t})^{\alpha} \tag{70}\]
\[= e^{-\rho t} \left( \frac{\lambda_y a_y + \lambda_x a_x}{X_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{\lambda_y (1 - a_y) + \lambda_x (1 - a_x)}{Y_t} \right)^{\alpha} \tag{71}\]
\[= \frac{e^{-\rho t}}{Z_t} (\lambda_y a_y + \lambda_x a_x) \tag{72}\]

where the first equality follows from the price normalization \(P_x^{1-\alpha} P_y^\alpha = 1\) and the last equality from \(Z = XP_x = XS^{-\alpha} = X(\overline{S} \frac{X}{\overline{S}})^{-\alpha} = (\overline{S})^{-\alpha} X^{1-\alpha} Y_t^{\alpha}\), with \(\overline{S} = \frac{\lambda_y (1 - a_y) + \lambda_x (1 - a_x)}{\lambda_x a_x + \lambda_y a_y}\).
Dropping the time and the regime subscript and applying Itô’s formula to $\xi_t$ yields,

$$df(t, Z) = f_t dt + f_z dZ_t + \frac{1}{2} f_{zz} dZ_t dZ_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (73)

$$= -\rho f_t dt - \frac{f_t}{Z} (\theta_z Z t + \sigma_{z,x} Z_t dW^x + \sigma_{z,y} Z_t dW^y)$$  \hspace{1cm} (74)

$$+ \frac{f_t}{Z^2} \left( (\sigma_{z,x} Z)^2 dt + (\sigma_{z,y} Z)^2 dt \right)$$

$$= f_t \left[ (-\rho - \sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2) dt + \sigma_{z,x} Z_t dW^x + \sigma_{z,y} Z_t dW^y \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (75)

The state-price density thus follows the process defined by

$$\frac{d\xi_t}{\xi_t} = -r_{z,i} dt - \sigma_{z,y} dW^x_t - \sigma_{z,x} dW^y_t, \quad i = \{L, H\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (76)

where $r_z$ is the risk-free rate prevailing under the world basket numeraire, given by

$$r_{z,i} = \rho + \theta_{z,i} - \left( \sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2 \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (77)

### 7.4 Evaluation of Sovereign Debt

The price of the debt is determined subject to a number of conditions. First, when the firm’s revenues $Z$ tend to infinity (and so do the revenues $R$), the value of the sovereign debt $D$ tends to the value of the risk-free debt

$$\lim_{Z \to \infty} D(Z) = \mathbb{E}_0^Q \left[ \int_0^{T(Z^D)} C e^{-r_{z,H} t} dt \right] = \frac{C}{r_{z,H}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (78)

Second, lenders value this debt upon default, which depends on the recovery rate. Upon default, the sovereign and its lenders restructure the terms of the debt contract and agree on a reduction of the debt service. I determine the value matching conditions that impose equality between the value of the sovereign debt and the value of the restructured debt in default. At default time $T(Z^D)$, the value of the sovereign debt is

$$\lim_{Z \to Z^D} D(Z) = \frac{C(1 - \phi)}{r_{z,L}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (79)

where $0 \leq 1 - \phi \leq 1$ denotes the recovery rate on the debt service $C$. The stochastic discount factor is defined as the Arrow-Debreu price of default $\mathbb{E}_0^Q \left[ e^{-r_{z,H} T(Z^D)} \right] = \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H}$, where $\beta_i$ is the negative root of the quadratic equation $\frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 \beta_i (\beta_i - 1) + \hat{\theta}_{z,i} \beta - r_{z,i} = 0$ in regime $i$, defined by

$$\beta_i = 1 - \frac{\hat{\theta}_{z,i}}{\sigma_z^2} - \sqrt{\left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\hat{\theta}_{z,i}}{\sigma_z^2} \right)^2 + \frac{2 \tilde{r}_{z,i}}{\sigma_z^2}} < 0, \quad i = \{L, H\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (80)

with $\sigma_z = \sqrt{\sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2}$. The value of the sovereign debt can then be rewritten as

$$D(Z) = \mathbb{E}_0^Q \left[ \int_0^{T(Z^D)} C e^{-r_{z,H} t} dt \right] + \mathbb{E}_0^Q \left[ \int_{T(Z^D)}^{\infty} (1 - \phi) C e^{-r_{z,L} t} dt \right]$$

$$= \frac{C}{r_{z,H}} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H} \right] + \frac{(1 - \phi) C}{r_{z,L}} \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H}$$  \hspace{1cm} (81)

(82)
where the default time on sovereign debt can be written as

\[
T(R^D) = \inf\{t \geq 0 \mid R_t \leq R^D\} \quad (83)
\]
\[
= \inf\{t \geq 0 \mid Z_t \leq Z^D\} \quad (84)
\]
\[
= T(Z^D) \quad (85)
\]

### 7.5 Evaluation of the Firms’ Assets and Default Policy

I here provide the valuation of the developed firm’s assets and default policy when this firm defaults either before or after the government of the emerging country defaults. The evaluation of the emerging firm’s assets is obtained by the same formulae when the emerging firm’s revenues \(Z_t\) replace the developed firm’s revenues \(\overline{SZ}_t\).

#### 7.5.1 Debt Evaluation

**Case I: the Firm Defaults after the Government Defaults, \(T(Z^D_f) > T(Z^D)\)**

The corporate debt value is

\[
D_f(Z) \mid_{T(Z^D_f) > T(Z^D)} = \mathbb{E}_T^{Q(Z)} \left[ \int_{T(Z^D_f)}^{T(Z^D)} C_f e^{-r_z,L t} \, dt + e^{-r_z,L T(Z^D)} D_f(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^D)} \right] \quad (86)
\]

\[
= \frac{C_f}{r_z,L} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D_f} \right)^{\beta_L} \right] + D_f(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^D)} \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D_f} \right)^{\beta_L} \quad (87)
\]

with

\[
D_f(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^D)} = \mathbb{E}_T^{Q(Z)} \left[ \int_{T(Z^D_f)}^{T(Z^D)} C_f e^{-r_z,L t} \, dt \right] \quad (88)
\]

\[
+ \mathbb{E}_T^{Q(Z)} \left[ \int_{T(Z^D_f)}^{\infty} (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) (\overline{SZ}_t - K) e^{-r_z,L t} \, dt \right] \quad (89)
\]

\[
= \frac{C_f}{r_z,L} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z^D}{Z^D_f} \right)^{\beta_L} \right] \quad (90)
\]

\[
+(1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) \left( \frac{\overline{SZ}^D_f}{r_z,L - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{K}{r_z,L} \right) \left( \frac{Z^D}{Z^D_f} \right)^{\beta_L} \quad (91)
\]
Case II: the Firm Defaults before the Government Defaults, \( T(Z^P_f) < T(Z^D) \)

The corporate debt value is

\[
D_f(Z) \mid_{T(Z^P_f) < T(Z^D)} = \mathbb{E}^Q_0 \left[ \int_0^{T(Z^D)} C_f e^{-r_z s t} dt + e^{-r_z s T(Z^P_f)} D_f(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^P_f)} \right] \\
= \frac{C_f}{r_z H} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D_f} \right)^{\beta_H} \right] + D_f(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^D_f)} \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D_f} \right)^{\beta_H}
\]

with

\[
D_f(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^P_f)} = \mathbb{E}^Q_T(Z^P_f) \left[ \int_{T(Z^P_f)}^{T(Z^D)} (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) (\overline{S} \bar{Z}_t - K) e^{-r_z s t} dt \right] \\
+ \mathbb{E}^Q_T(Z^P_f) \left[ \int_{T(Z^D)}^{\infty} (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) (\overline{S} \bar{Z}_t - K) e^{-r_z s t} dt \right]
\]

\[
= (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) \left( \frac{\overline{S} Z^P_f}{r_z H - \bar{\theta}_z H} - \frac{K}{r_z H} \right) \left[ 1 - \left( Z^D_f / Z^D \right)^{\beta_H} \right]
\]

\[
+ (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) \left( \frac{\overline{S} Z^P_f}{r_z L - \bar{\theta}_z L} - \frac{K}{r_z L} \right) \left( Z^D_f / Z^D \right)^{\beta_H}
\]

7.5.2 Firm Value

Case I: the Firm Defaults after the Government Defaults, \( T(Z^P_f) > T(Z^D) \)

The levered firm value \( V(Z) \) satisfies

\[
V(Z) \mid_{T(Z^P_f) > T(Z^D)} = \mathbb{E}^Q_0 \left[ \int_0^{T(Z^D)} ((1 - \tau) (\overline{S} \bar{Z}_t - K) + \tau C_f) e^{-r_z s t} dt \right] \\
+ \mathbb{E}^Q_0 \left[ e^{-r_z s T(Z^D)} V(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^D)} \right]
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{(1 - \tau) \overline{S} Z}{r_z H - \bar{\theta}_z H} + \frac{\tau C_f - (1 - \tau) K}{r_z H} \right) \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H} \right]
\]

\[
+ V(Z) \mid_{t=T(Z^D)} \left( \frac{Z}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H}
\]
with

\[
V(Z) \mid_{t = T(Z^D)} = \mathbb{E}_T^Q \left[ \int_{T(Z^D)}^{T(Z_f^D)} \left( (1 - \tau) (S_Zt - K) + \tau C_f \right) e^{-r_Zt} dt \right] + \mathbb{E}_T^Q \left[ \int_{T(Z_f^D)}^{\infty} \left( (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) (S_Zt - K) e^{-r_Zt} dt \right) \right] (102)
\]

\[
= (1 - \tau) \left( \frac{SZ^D}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,H}} \right) + \tau C_f \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z^D}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_H} \right] (104)
\]

\[
- \eta(1 - \tau) \left( \frac{SZ^D}{r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,L}} \right) \left( \frac{Z^D}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_L} (105)
\]

Case II: the Firm Defaults before the Government Defaults, \( T(Z_f^D) < T(Z^D) \)

The levered firm value \( V(Z) \) satisfies

\[
V(Z) \mid_{T(Z_f^D) < T(Z^D)} = \mathbb{E}_o^Q \left[ \int_0^{T(Z_f^D)} \left( (1 - \tau) (S_Zt - K) + \tau C_f \right) e^{-r_Zt} dt \right] + \mathbb{E}_o^Q \left[ e^{-r_Zt} T(Z_f^D) V(Z) \mid_{t = T(Z_f^D)} \right] (107)
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{(1 - \tau)SZ}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{(1 - \tau)K - \tau C_f}{r_{z,H}} \right) \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z^{ds_f}}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_H} \right] (108)
\]

\[
+ V(Z) \mid_{t = T(Z_f^D)} \left( \frac{Z^{ds_f}}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_H} (109)
\]

with

\[
V(Z) \mid_{t = T(Z_f^D)} = \mathbb{E}_T^Q \left[ \int_{T(Z_f^D)}^{T(Z^D)} \left( (1 - \tau) (S_Zt - K) e^{-r_Zt} dt \right) \right] (110)
\]

\[
+ \mathbb{E}_T^Q \left[ \int_{T(Z_f^D)}^{\infty} \left( (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) (S_Zt - K) e^{-r_Zt} dt \right) \right] (111)
\]

\[
= (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) \left( \frac{SZ_f^D}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,H}} \right) \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z_f^D}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_H} \right] (112)
\]

\[
+ (1 - \eta)(1 - \tau) \left( \frac{SZ_f^D}{r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,L}} \right) \left( \frac{Z_f^D}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_H} (113)
\]

7.5.3 Default Policy
Case I: the Firm Defaults after the Government Defaults, $T(Z_f^D) > T(Z^D)$

As the value of the firm until sovereign default is, by assumption, independent from the default policy, the optimal default policy in this case is the one that maximizes equity value at time $T(Z^D)$

$$E(Z \mid t=T(Z^D)) \mid T(Z_f^D) > T(Z^D) = V(Z \mid t=T(Z^D)) \mid T(Z_f^D) > T(Z^D) - D_f(Z \mid t=T(Z^D)) \mid T(Z_f^D) > T(Z^D)$$ (114)

$$= (1-\tau) \left( \frac{SZ}{r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,L}} \right) - (1-\tau) \frac{C_f}{r_{z,L}} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_L} \right]$$ (116)

$$- (1-\tau) \left( \frac{SZ_f^D}{r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,L}} \right) \left( \frac{Z_f^D}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_L}$$ (117)

The first-order maximization yields

$$\frac{\partial E(Z \mid t=T(Z^D))}{\partial Z} = (1-\tau) \frac{S}{r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{\beta_L}{Z_f^D} \left( 1 - (\frac{S}{r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,L}}) \left( \frac{Z_f^D}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_L-1} \right)$$ (118)

Using the smooth-pasting condition $\frac{\partial [E(Z) \mid z=T(Z^D)]}{\partial z}{z=Z_f^D} = 0$, we have

$$Z_f^D \mid T(Z_f^D) > T(Z^D) = \frac{\beta_L (K + C_f) \left( r_{z,L} - \theta_{z,L} \right)}{(\beta_L - 1) S r_{z,L}}$$ (119)

Case II: the Firm Defaults before the Government Defaults, $T(Z_f^D) < T(Z^D)$

The value of equity is given by

$$E(Z \mid t=0) \mid T(Z_f^D) < T(Z^D) = V(Z \mid t=0) \mid T(Z_f^D) < T(Z^D) - D_f(Z \mid t=0) \mid T(Z_f^D) < T(Z^D)$$ (120)

$$= (1-\tau) \left( \frac{SZ}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,H}} \right)$$ (121)

$$- (1-\tau) \frac{C_f}{r_{z,H}} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{Z}{Z_f^D} \right)^{\beta_H} \right]$$ (122)

$$- (1-\tau) \left( \frac{SZ_f^D}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,H}} \right) \left( \frac{Z_f^D}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H}$$ (123)

The first-order maximization yields

$$\frac{\partial E(Z \mid t=0)}{\partial Z} = (1-\tau) \frac{S}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{\beta_H}{Z_f^D} \left( 1 - (\frac{S}{r_{z,H} - \theta_{z,H}} - \frac{K}{r_{z,H}}) \left( \frac{Z_f^D}{Z^D} \right)^{\beta_H-1} \right)$$ (124)
Using the smooth-pasting condition \( \frac{\partial |E(Z)|_{t=0}}{\partial Z} \bigg|_{Z=Z_f^p} = 0 \), we have

\[
Z_f^D \bigg|_{T(Z_f^p)<T(Z^p)} = \frac{\beta_H (K + C_f) \left( r_{z,H} - \dot{\theta}_{z,H} \right)}{(\beta_H - 1) Sr_{z,H}} \tag{125}
\]

### 7.5.4 Equity Return Volatility

Let’s determine the volatility of either firm’s equity return, which is denoted by \( \frac{dE}{E} \). Dropping the time and the regime subscript and applying Itô’s formula to \( E_t \) yields

\[
dE(t, Z) = E_t dt + E_z dZ + \frac{1}{2} E_{y,z} dZ dZ
\]

\[
= E_z (\theta_z Z dt + \sigma_{z,x} Z dW^x + \sigma_{z,y} Z dW^y)
\]

\[
\quad + E_{zz} \left[ (\sigma_{z,x} Z)^2 dt + (\sigma_{z,y} Z)^2 dt \right]
\]

\[
= [\theta_z Z + (\sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2) E_{y,z} Z^2] dt + E_z Z (\sigma_{z,x} dW^x + \sigma_{z,y} dW^y) \tag{128}
\]

Hence, the dynamics of the equity return is

\[
\frac{dE}{E} = \frac{1}{E} \left[ \theta_z Z + (\sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2) E_{zz} Z^2 \right] dt + \frac{E_z Z}{E} (\sigma_{z,x} dW^x + \sigma_{z,y} dW^y) \tag{129}
\]

where \( E_z \) and \( E_{zz} \) denote the first and second derivatives of \( E \) with respect to the state variable \( Z \), respectively. Finally, the equity return volatility is given by

\[
\sigma_E = \frac{E_z Z}{E} \sqrt{\sigma_{z,x}^2 + \sigma_{z,y}^2} \tag{130}
\]