Université de Lausanne
Ecole des HEC
Département d'économétrie et d'économie politique

Wednesday March 11, 2009, 13:00
Extranef, Dorigny, room 126

Dezsö SZALAY
(University of Bonn, Germany)

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
and Unknown Quality Capacity

Abstract
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous studies, we assume demand is influenced by a quality choice, and the firm has private information about its quality capacity in addition to its cost. Under natural conditions, asymmetric information about the quality capacity is irrelevant. The optimal pricing is weakly above marginal costs for all types and no type is excluded.

Web site of the seminar (with paper online): http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/evenements-english/e-sem-all-2008-09.htm