Université de Lausanne
Ecole des HEC
Département d'économétrie et d'économie politique

Wednesday February 25, 2009, 13:00
Extranef, Dorigny, room 109

Frédéric ROBERT-NICOUD
(University of Geneva)

Property Rights and Land Use Regulations

 
Abstract

We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints are interpreted as shadow taxes that increase the land rent of already developed plots and reduce the amount of new housing developments. In general equilibrium, locations with nicer amenities (or lower development costs) are more developed and, as a consequence, more regulated. We test our model predictions by geographically matching amenity, land use, and historical Census data to metropolitan area level survey data on regulatory restrictiveness. Following the predictions of the model and controlling for a number of alternative explanations, we use access to the coast as an instrumental variable and demonstrate that metropolitan areas with better access are more developed and more tightly regulated. Consistent with theory, more regulated metropolitan areas also grow more slowly.

Web site of the seminar (with paper online): http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/evenements-english/e-sem-all-2008-09.htm