Université de Lausanne
Faculté des
HEC
Département d'économétrie
et d'économie politique
Cahier de recherches économiques du DEEP No. 13.09
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Contracts
versus Salaries in Matching: Comment
(replaced by Cahier 14.05 "Contracts
versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result")
June 2013
Abstract
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (Amer. Econ. Rev. 102(1): 594-601,
2012) to show that under the assumption of unilaterally substitutable preferences
a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with
salaries. In particular, my result applies to the recently studied problem of
cadet-to-branch matching.
Keywords: Matching; Matching with contracts; Matching with salaries; Embedding; Substitutes; Unilateral substitutes
JEL classification: C78